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For those interested in expanding rights of any kind, there are two
historically honored strategies. One is to enlarge the category of rights
beyond what the legal system now recognizes. You might think of
Thurgood Marshall, the great civil rights lawyer who argued Brown v.
Board of Education,1 as having that strategy. He really wanted to en-
large the category of rights enjoyed by African-Americans. Another
strategy is just to try to ensure that the rights that are now on the
books actually exist in the world. Martin Luther King Jr., much of the
time, had that strategy-not the enlarging-rights, but enforcing-rights
strategy-insisting, as King did, "we just want you (meaning white
America) to be faithful to the rights you recognize on paper." With re-
spect to animals, there is a great deal of work to be done in the
Thurgood Marshall direction-to expand the category of rights by en-
suring that animals are used less cruelly, or less frequently, or maybe
much less, as food, in entertainment, or in scientific experiments. But
what I am going to try to explore here is the Martin Luther King strat-
egy-that is, to see what might be done to try to ensure that such
rights, as are now recognized on paper, are actually enjoyed by ani-
mals in the world. I will try to make a few suggestions for how we
might go about doing that.
* Mr. Sunstein is the Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Juris-
prudence at the University of Chicago Law School, and also a member of the Depart-
ment of Political Science. He graduated from both Harvard College and Harvard Law
School, after which he clerked for Justice Benjamin Kaplan of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts and then for Justice Thurgood Marshall of the United States
Supreme Court. This essay is a mild revision of oral remarks made in October of 2001 at
the Ninth Annual Animal Law Conference at Northwestern School of Law of Levis &
Clark College. Readers are asked to make allowances for the informality of the
presentation.
1 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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My first observation is that the panoply of rights that animals now
have at both the state and federal levels is much more expansive than
outside observers acknowledge-both observers who are skeptical of
the idea of animal rights and observers who are enthusiastic about the
idea of animal rights. That is to say, that at the state and federal levels
there is a lot of raw material that has not been used very much. If one
investigates the laws of almost every state, one finds that that states
protect animals-domestic animals certainly-and to a significant de-
gree non-domestic or wild animals too. They protect them against
human cruelty, which is defined broadly most of the time to include
not only cruel acts such as torture and infliction of pain, but also omis-
sion. Thus, people are under an obligation most of the time, in most
states, to ensure that their animals are well-fed, that they are well-
nourished, that they receive veterinary care, and much more. Hence
domestic animals to a large degree have protection of safety and secur-
ity, which includes protections against welfare deprivation of the kind
that human beings actually lack at the state level, as most Americans
do not have this degree of protection.
At the federal level, there is also a great deal of legislation protect-
ing animals against suffering and neglect. A statute that is dear to my
heart, although I do not believe it means a great deal in the world,
protects horses from cruel treatment and particularly protects injured
horses from human exploitation. 2 The Horse Protection Act is a statute
that, my guess is, was pressed by a few members of the House or the
Senate who were really interested in this, and no one stood against
it-though it has not meant very much in the real world. The federal
Animal Welfare Act creates something like an incipient federal Bill of
Rights for animals, providing protection against suffering and abuse
and also creating affirmative obligations of humane handling, care,
treatment, and transportation of animals-not only by exhibitors, but
also by research facilities and dealers.3 The upshot is that federal and
state law recognize a great deal in the way of rights for animals, not
only against torture and abuse, but also against neglect.
There is an unfortunate qualification here. All of us who have in-
vestigated the area, even a little bit, are aware that the federal govern-
ment devotes very little in the way of resources to the protection of
animals against suffering and abuse. The Animal Welfare Act is badly
underfunded and, to say the least, is not a high priority in the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, which is, in any case, subject to intense lobbying
pressure from those who do not want greater protection given to ani-
mals. But if the Animal Welfare Act were taken seriously, we could
accomplish a great deal to reduce animal suffering.
I have four simple suggestions designed to make the law on the
books mean something actual and true in the real world. The sugges-
tions are going to start modest and will get more and more ambitious.
2 Horse Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1831 (2000).
3 7 U.S.C. § 2131 et seq. (2000).
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My claim is that, for those of you who are interested in animal rights,
there is really an enormous amount that actually can be done through
creative lawyering. It is just starting to be done-what is missing is
enough people really dedicated to ensuring enforcement of the law.
The first suggestion, and the simplest one, is that human beings
should be able to bring suit in federal court, if they (that is, human
beings) suffer some kind of injury as a result of a violation done to
animals. I say this is the modest suggestion because there are already
cases tending to recognize this right.4 The notion is that human beings
who go to zoos, or own animals, or who enjoy seeing animals in one
place or another, ought to be allowed to bring suit to protect animals
from injury, if the injury to the animals inflicts harm on human be-
ings. I hope it is clear that this is a very modest suggestion, as it does
not recognize rights in animals as such. It recognizes rights in human
beings who are injured if their animals are hurt. Only slightly more
controversially, millions of people enjoy seeing animals that are not
their own and are miserable upon seeing those animals suffering.
These people ought to have a right to bring suit in federal court, if the
law is being violated, to ensure that the law is respected. There is a
pocket of cases, some involving the Animal Legal Defense Fund, that
are starting to recognize this very limited right on the part of human
beings to bring suit.5
My second suggestion is also modest, but slightly less so, and I
really hope some work will be done to see how feasible the idea is. It
used to be, about thirty years ago, that there was a federal law that
prohibited certain conduct, such as securities fraud, if the individuals
who were subject to securities fraud could bring an implied cause of
action against the person who was violating the law, even if the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission was just sitting on its hands. The idea
was that if there was a violation of the law by some company-which,
for example, lies in its prospectus or commits fraud-there could be an
implied cause of action against the violator, even if the government did
not have the resources or the inclination to act. One of the most regret-
table developments of the last 25 years is that the Supreme Court of
the United States has cut back on this notion of implied causes of ac-
tion. It is not so willing to allow private persons to sue admitted viola-
tors of the law if the federal agency is sitting on its hands.
Now, here's the thought: What the Supreme Court says about
these implied causes of action is not binding on state courts. I have
done some preliminary investigation and in many states there is a real
interest in allowing human beings (we are still talking about human
beings) to bring suit against violators of the law, if the enforcement
authority of the state has not done anything. And what these states
4 See e.g. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221 (1986);
Humane Society of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Alaska Fish
& Wildlife Fedn- v. Dunkle, 928 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1987).
5 See e.g. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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tend to say is, "Look, our state has forbidden certain misconduct. It is
against the law and we will allow a kind of supplement to the state
prohibition, enforceable by the state agency-a supplement by individ-
uals who are affected by the prohibition." This idea is a little more
ambitious than the first. There are not any cases yet involving the
anti-cruelty provisions, but there ought to be. Some state courts should
be interested in expanding their implied cause of action idea to bring
in these cases so that we break the prosecutor's monopoly on the
animal cruelty law.
The reason we want to break the monopoly is not because the
prosecutors are necessarily bad, but because they have tons and tons of
things to do, and sometimes prosecuting animal crimes is just not a
high priority for them. Even if it is not a high priority for them, it is an
illegality. Why not allow affected private human beings to help out the
prosecutor by picking up some of the slack? I bet some state courts
would be receptive to this argument. What little research has been
done thus far-maybe some of you will do some more-suggests that
there is a real opportunity in this and it would be a great thing for
animals, a good thing for human beings, and probably a heroic thing
for some states to do.
The third idea is a little more ambitious and complex. It begins
with the fact that state courts, unlike federal courts, often do not have
a constitutional limit on who can sue; they certainly are not con-
strained by the limitations of Article III of the Constitution, which ap-
plies only to federal courts. The third idea continues to observe that
some state courts, unlike federal courts, just allow citizens to sue as
citizens against private people who violate the law, or against the gov-
ernment for failing to enforce the law. The latter case is called a man-
damus action, and it requires the government to enforce the law. Now
it might be that, in some states, new legislative action would be needed
to confer a right on the part of citizens, as such, to bring actions in a
court 1) to prosecute law violators; 2) to get an injunction; or 3) to ob-
tain damages. Or it might be that legislation is needed to allow people
to mandamus the prosecutor to enforce the law in cases where there
has been a clear violation. On the other hand, it may well be, in some
states, that new legislation is not needed, and that the citizen suits are
available under these old things, called prerogative writs-of which
mandamus is the most famous.
This idea is a little more ambitious because I am talking, in this
third suggestion, about citizen suits, not about suits by an affected
human being. My only suggestion is that on animals' behalf, there
ought to be an ability to build on what some state courts have already
recognized-that is, citizen's suits in certain circumstances.
Thus far, I have suggested three ideas in decreasing order of mod-
esty. The first is that human beings should be allowed to bring suit in
federal court if they have been injured as a result of violations of the
law by private or public actors. The second suggestion is that there
should be, and might well be, an implied cause of action in state court
[Vol. 8:i
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for violations of the anti-cruelty law. The third suggestion is that citi-
zen suits in state court ought to be available, and ought to be brought,
either against the violators or against the government, for failing to
enforce the law.
The fourth suggestion is the most ambitious. It is that some states
and the federal government, in the next twenty years, should create a
private right of action on the part of animals, who would be the main
plaintiffs, to vindicate their rights (and they are rights, as a matter of
current state and federal law) against those who have violated them.
In a way, this seems like a radical idea because now we are talking
about suits by animals in their own name. But it may not be as radical
as it seems. Of course, it is the case that human beings would be some-
thing like trustees on the behalf of animals. In the days of slavery,
lawsuits were available not only by slave holders, but also by slaves
against people who had behaved illegally or cruelly toward them. It is
true that the category of illegality was limited-they were slaves after
all, without a lot of rights. But it was also the case that slaves had
protection against certain infliction of suffering by owners and others
against them. My suggestion is that we ought to recognize for animals
at least what was recognized for slaves-that is, a private cause of ac-
tion that animals enjoy as themselves in their own rights against vio-
lations of the law.
We are talking here about an idea that is in one sense radical be-
cause these are suits by animals, but in another sense it is very mun-
dane because the suits that animals would bring would be to prevent
conduct that is recognized under state or federal law already to be ille-
gal. If the idea seems radical, just notice for a moment that almost
every federal environmental statute creates a citizen suit to supple-
ment the enforcement authority of the Environmental Protection
Agency. This is, in a way, a more modest suggestion than that because
the idea is that animals who are actually injured or at risk would bring
the suit, not citizens who have no palpable stake in the outcome (held
to be unlawful under Article H6). If the idea continues to seem radical,
we should just notice that for centuries the Anglo-American system
has had parallel criminal and civil remedies-our tort system parallels
our criminal justice system. I am merely suggesting that we expand
that idea of parallel tort remedies to the domain of animal welfare.
I want to make a few closing remarks about these four sugges-
tions. One thing that those of us interested in protecting animal well-
being might focus on is what types of objections would be made against
these suggestions. My field of vision is undoubtedly limited by my own
imagination, but I have difficulty seeing what objections-what rea-
sonable objections-would be made to an effort to ensure enforcement
of laws that are already on the books and that are pitifully under-en-
forced. Perhaps the most effective objection would be that giving the
government a monopoly on the animal cruelty legislation, either at the
6 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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federal level or at the state level, is necessary to prevent frivolous,
harassing, or baseless litigation. The state of California, for example,
might think that if we allow any affected person, or any affected
animal, to bring suit for what are alleged to be violations, then we are
going to get, in practice, a lot of frivolous or baseless actions. This is, in
the abstract, an obviously plausible objection, but I have a couple of
things to say about it.
One thing is that under the state laws creating citizen suits to
protect the environment, there has not been a torrent of frivolous liti-
gation. On the contrary, there have been very few lawsuits and they
have not been frivolous. Maybe that is not so surprising if we consider
the fact that bringing a lawsuit is expensive and not a lot of fun, even
for people who are committed to the underlying cause. So given the
fact that a lawsuit is expensive and usually not fun to bring, it is prob-
ably just not true that the remedies I am suggesting would give rise to
a lot of baseless lawsuits. The second response to this concern is that
our legal system has strategies to filter out frivolous or baseless ac-
tions. If we think those strategies do not work here, or would not work
here, it would be very surprising if we did not have the creativity to
think of ways to be more firm in filtering out frivolous or baseless ac-
tions under the rubrics I am describing.
I want to conclude with some brief remarks about broader issues. I
have been speaking of animal welfare and animal well-being, and not
much about animal rights. Is there a connection between the ideas I
have offered today and ideas about animal rights, and about whether
animals are property? Here we can begin by taking a little bit of Mar-
tin Luther King's strategy first-trying to ensure that the world con-
forms to what is said on paper. Consider some analogies, designed to
suggest that objects with the status of property can also be protected
through the law.
For example, it is not odd for the legal system both to offer protec-
tion for a pristine area where the air quality is very high and to say
human beings are allowed to bring suit to ensure that the air quality
remains very high. It is clear that art and other cultural treasures can
be protected, and are protected, against human depredation, even if
those things are owned and do not have the status of persons. If the
government wants to protect, for example, a painting of Leonardo
DaVinci against injury, even from the owner of the painting, that
would be just fine. We can find many parallels where owners do not
have unlimited rights over the things that they own. As a matter of
tort law, every homeowner's rights are sharply limited, even over what
he or she owns. The ownership limitation applies not just by allowing
the prosecutor to sue to prevent or punish crimes, but also by allowing
ordinary people to sue to prevent or punish torts. So, my simplest sug-
gestion is that things that have the status of property could, in princi-
ple, also have rights. In fact, our legal system is not so far from that in
respect to animals because there is a panoply of protections at both the
state and federal level that creates rights for things with the status of
[Vol. 8:i
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property. However, we must acknowledge that, in this domain,
Thurgood Marshall's strategy of enlarging rights rather than merely
enforcing them, has some serious advantages over Martin Luther
King's strategy.
Most people, on reflection, do not consider animals that they "own"
to be things or objects. People who have dogs, or horses, or cats are
most unlikely to have the same attitude toward living creatures that
they have toward books, tables, and chairs. So the rhetoric of owner-
ship really does misdescribe people's conceptions of and relationships
to other living beings. There is probably a sense in which they do not
really consider their cats, their dogs, or their horses "theirs"-at least
they do not on reflection. It is not merely the case that the rhetoric of
property misdescribes people's relationship toward animals. The same
rhetoric probably damages their relationship too. In the end, I believe
that Steven Wise, Gary Francione, and others are correct to reject the
rhetoric of property. I do not entirely accept the reasons they give; they
tend to think, in my view wrongly, that "property" cannot have rights.
I suggest instead that the rhetoric of property tends to undermine and
devalue the interests that human beings, on reflection, acknowledge
that animals possess.
The four suggestions I have made are intended as a limited step
toward the redescription of the relationship between human beings
and other animals-steps that by themselves do not repudiate the no-
tion of property, but maybe go a long way within the legal system to-
ward changing that notion. Ultimately, then, I believe the legal system
should not recognize animals as objects or things. It should see them
as creatures, like human beings, with interests and concerns of their
own. But the project I have tried to describe is not nearly as ambitious
as that. All I have tried to suggest is that an enormous amount of good
can come from enforcing existing laws and from making sure that
what happens in the world conforms to what we say on paper.
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